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The Impunity Gap of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes
and Consequences
By LESLIE HASKELL AND LARS WALDORF*
To insist on the right to justice for all victims, as did the [1994] U.N.
Commission of Experts, is not to deny the genocide, nor does such
an insistence equate war crimes with genocide; it simply asserts that
all victims, regardless of their affiliation, regardless of the nature of
the crime committed against them, and regardless of the affiliation
of the perpetrator, must have equal opportunity to seek redress for
the wrongs done them.'
I. Introduction
In three short months between April and July 1994, Rwanda
experienced a genocide that killed nearly three-quarters of the Tutsi
minority and thousands of Hutu who opposed the genocide or were
mistaken for Tutsi.2 In total, the genocide claimed the lives of more
than half a million people. The extreme brutality was led by a group
of Hutu extremists within the government and executed by the
national army, local militia groups, and ordinary citizens urged to kill
by the government.
. Leslie Haskell is a Rwanda Researcher at Human Rights Watch and former
legal officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Lars Waldorf is a
Senior Lecturer in International Human Rights Law at the Centre for Applied
Human Rights and York Law School. We are grateful to Kenneth Roth and Aisling
Reidy of Human Rights Watch, Jennifer Trahan, Victor Peskin, and Roger Des
Forges for insightful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM
IN RWANDA 90 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/62098.
2. Rwanda's population of approximately seven million is composed of three
ethnic groups: Hutu (85 percent), Tutsi (14 percent), and Twa (1 percent). Lessons
from Rwanda: The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide, THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/infokit.shtml (last visited Nov.
13,2010).
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A much less-known part of the story is that a significant number
of civilians also perished in 1994 at the hands of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RFP), a rebel group composed largely of Tutsi exiles
in Uganda and led by the current Rwandan President, Paul Kagame.
The RPF ended the genocide and took power in July 1994. Both
before and since that date, the RPF committed atrocities, including
massacres, political assassinations, and summary executions. The
discussion here will focus only on RPF killings committed in Rwanda
in 1994. While these paled in number to the genocidal killings, the
nature and scale of RPF crimes should not be ignored. Many of the
killings took place after the RPF had already gained control over
parts of the country; they therefore cannot be explained as "collateral
damage" of the conflict.
Nearly sixteen years later, little to no accountability has been
secured for these crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), established by the United Nations Security Council
in 1994 and tasked with prosecuting "persons responsible for
genocide and serious violations of international humanitarian law"
between January 1 and December 31, 1994, has only prosecuted
individuals for involvement in the genocide. Despite repeated
affirmations that the Tribunal's jurisdiction includes RPF crimes and
reminders from the U.N. Security Council that RPF crimes should be
prosecuted, the Office of the Prosecutor has not requested a single
indictment for RPF crimes.
In 2008, ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow made the decision to
transfer one of its investigations - a massacre of clergy in Kabgayi by
RPF soldiers - to the Government of Rwanda for domestic
prosecution. The result was a sham trial that ignored crucial
evidence in an apparent attempt to shield senior RPF members from
criminal responsibility. Despite being alerted to these shortcomings,
the ICTR Prosecutor subsequently stated that the trial was fair and
that his office did not plan to prosecute any other RPF cases.
3. The ICTR has indicted more than seventy-five persons in connection with the
Rwandan genocide, fifty of whom have had their cases completed as of this writing.
To date, the Tribunal has prosecuted only Hutu, with the exception of Georges
Ruggiu, a European who worked for the RTLM radio station which broadcast hate
speech and incited anti-Tutsi violence. Status of Cases, ICTR, http://69.94.11.53/
ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
4. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5409th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5409 (June 4,
2008).
5. Statement by Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR, U.N. SCOR, 64th
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The Prosecutor's abdication of his responsibility to prosecute
RPF officials contrasts sharply with the experiences of other
international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) which have prosecuted individuals from all sides of
their respective conflicts. Prosecutor Jallow's failure to prosecute the
RPF has negative consequences for Rwanda, the ICTR, and
international justice. First, it leaves a legacy of "victor's justice" and
impunity that may have already encouraged RPF crimes in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Second, it has contributed to an
inaccurate and incomplete picture of the events of 1994, thus opening
the door to revisionism on both sides. Third, it has passed up a
further opportunity to strengthen the Rwandan judicial system.
Finally, the failure to prosecute undermines the Tribunal's legacy and
sets a bad precedent for international justice.
II. Background
In July 1994, the RPF took control of Rwanda through military
force and put an end to the genocide. However, in the period leading
up to the RPF victory and the months that followed, the RPF killed
approximately thirty thousand civilians, most of whom were Hutu. 6 A
team from the U.N. High Commission for Refugees documented
these crimes as it traveled throughout the country in August and early
September of 1994, looking for ways to speed up the repatriation of
the nearly two million refugees who had fled the country since April.
The team was given access to RPF-controlled territory and was able
to meet with a larger and more diverse group of witnesses than
afforded other foreigners in Rwanda at the time. Consequently, it
conducted interviews detailing widespread and systematic
disappearances, murders, and massacres where victims included
Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009).
6. See ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 728,734 (1999).
7. Id. at 726-28. The team was headed by Robert Gersony, which led to the
findings being known as the "Gersony Report." The United Nations took immediate
action on the findings, sending the Assistant Secretary General in charge of
Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, and others to Kigali to meet senior Rwandan
government officials and inform them of Gersony's findings. However, the United
Nations never publicly endorsed these findings because it was concerned about the
extent of the alleged abuses, the potential impact on the new government, and the
likely negative publicity for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
(UNAMIR). In fact, when Gersony's findings were leaked to the press, the U.N.
denied their very existence. Id. at 728-31.
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women, children, and the elderly. The team estimated that the RPF
killed between twenty-five thousand and forty-five thousand civilians
in 1994.9
In 1994, a U.N.-appointed Commission of Experts also found
that RPF soldiers had "perpetrated serious breaches of international
humanitarian law [i.e., war crimes] and crimes against humanity" and
"strongly recommend[ed]" prosecution of these crimes.10  The
Commission's report served as the catalyst for the establishment of
the ICTR and led its temporal jurisdiction to be extended to
December 31, 1994 to ensure prosecution of RPF crimes."
Human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, also investigated and publicized RPF
massacres.12 Alison Des Forges, senior adviser to the Africa Division
at Human Rights Watch and renowned expert on Rwanda,
concluded:
These killings were wide-spread, systematic and involved large
numbers of participants and victims. They were too many and too
much alike to have been unconnected crimes executed by
individual soldiers or low-ranking officers. Given the disciplined
nature of the RPF forces and the extent of communication up and
down the hierarchy, commanders of this army must have known of
and at least tolerated these practices.
Filip Reyntjens, a long-time Rwanda expert, states that there has
been a "conspiracy of silence" around these killings, partly because
"witnesses of NGOs and international organizations feared expulsion,
and Rwandans ran the risk of reprisals against themselves."1 4
8. Id. at 727.
9. Id. at 728.
10. Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established
in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 91 146-50, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (Oct. 4, 1994).
11. Id. at $T149-50.
12. See DES FORGES, supra note 6, at 702-26; AMNESTY INT'L, RWANDA:
REPORTS OF KILLINGS AND ABDUCTIONS BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC ARMY,
APRIL-AUGUST 1994 (1994), available at http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/info
/AFR47/016/1994.
13. DES FORGES, supra note 6, at 734-35.
14. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: L'Histoire Secrite, AFRICA TODAY, Spring 2008, at
141-42.
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III. The Absence of Accountability for RPF Crimes
A. The National Impunity Gap
Despite public declarations that soldiers who killed civilians in
1994 would face justice, the RPF-led government has done little to
ensure accountability for these crimes. Prior to the 2008 Kabgayi case
transferred from the ICTR (discussed infra), military courts had
prosecuted only thirty-two RPF soldiers." All were charged with
ordinary murder, not war crimes or crimes against humanity, and all
received punishments of six years imprisonment or less.16 Most were
low-ranking or ordinary soldiers, with the exception of one lieutenant
who was acquitted and one major whose original life sentence was
reduced to six years on appeal." In total, these prosecutions account
for the deaths of approximately one hundred civilians, a fraction of
the estimated thirty thousand killed by the RPF.
The Rwandan government's strategy in covering up RPF crimes
has been relatively consistent since 1994. The government minimizes
the nature and extent of these crimes, arguing that they were isolated
incidents of "revenge killings" by a small number of rogue soldiers.
The government also asserts that these rogue soldiers have been
brought to justice and punished where necessary." Finally, the
Rwandan government equates any demands for justice for RPF
crimes with genocide denial.20
The government also refused to allow non-military courts to try
RPF crimes. Initially, Rwanda's community-based courts, known as
"gacaca jurisdictions," had subject matter jurisdiction over these
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 103.
16. Id. at 104-09.
17. Id. at 104, 107
18. Id. at 104-09
19. Rwanda Denies Rebels Escaped Justice Over Genocide, AFRICA TIMES NEWS,
June 3, 2009, available at http://www.africa-times-news.com/2009/06/rwanda-denies-
rebels-escaped-justice-over-genocide.
20. President Paul Kagame, Preface, in AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND
BEYOND, at xxiii (Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman, eds., 2008) (While some rogue
RPF elements committed crimes against civilians during the civil war after 1990, and
during the anti-genocidal campaign, individuals were punished severely.... To try to
construct a case of moral equivalency between genocide crimes and isolated crimes
committed by rogue RPF members is morally bankrupt and an insult to all
Rwandans, especially survivors of the genocide. Objective history illustrates the
degeneracy of this emerging revisionism.).
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crimes.2 However, in 2004, the National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions removed jurisdiction after individuals in pilot
jurisdictions had called for justice for RPF crimes.22 A national
campaign insisted that RPF crimes were not to be raised in gacaca.
As one Rwandan told Human Rights Watch,
The biggest problem with gacaca is the crimes we can't discuss.
We're told that certain crimes, those killings by the RPF, cannot be
discussed in gacaca even though the families need to talk. We're
told to be quiet on these matters. It's a big problem. It's not
.24justice.
Given the government's failure to provide meaningful accountability
inside Rwanda, the only hope for justice for victims of RPF crimes lay
in the hands of the ICTR.
B. The ICTR's Impunity Gap
The ICTR's relations with Rwanda were difficult from its
inception in late 1994. The Rwandan government was the only
country to vote against the creation of the Tribunal at the Security
Council.26  The government objected to the Tribunal's location in
Tanzania (rather than Rwanda), contested its temporal jurisdiction
(excluding the build-up to the genocide from 1990 to 1993), its
21. Organic Law No. 40/2000 (Jan. 26, 2001) Setting Up "Gacaca Jurisdictions"
and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or
Crimes Against Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990, and December 31,
1994, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452e37514.html.
22. Organic Law No. 16/2004 (June 19, 2004) Establishing the Organization,
Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and
Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity,
Committed Between October 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994, available at
http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf-state/2004-Gacaca-Courts-Organic-Law-16-
004.pdf.
23. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 86.
24. Id. at 90-91 (quoting Human Rights Watch interview with former police
officer, in Kigali, Rwanda (May 30, 2004)).
25. France and Spain have issued arrest warrants for high-ranking RPF officers in
connection with alleged crimes committed in 1994. These prosecutions have
increased pressure on both the ICTR and the Rwandan government to be seen to act
on RPF crimes. However, both cases have been labeled "politically motivated" by
the Rwandan government and largely ignored by the international community.
France may drop its prosecution of Major Rose Kabuye given its recent
rapprochement with Rwanda, and Spain is unlikely to gain custody of any indicted
suspects. Consequently, neither prosecution appears likely to result in convictions.
26. See VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS:
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 159 (2008).
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primacy over Rwandan national courts, its exclusion of civil parties,
and its refusal to apply the death penalty.27 The Rwandan
government has regularly criticized the ICTR for its performance,
particularly when accused persons have been acquitted, and has
periodically interfered with the workings of the Tribunal.28
The most contentious issue, however, has always been RPF
crimes. 29 Rwanda wanted the Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction to end
in mid-July 1994 when the genocide came to a halt."o This would have
excluded many of the crimes committed by the RPF. However, the
Security Council set December 31, 1994, as the cut-off date.31 The
U.N. also chose to situate the ICTR outside Rwanda "to ensure not
only the reality but also the appearance of complete impartiality and
objectivity in the prosecution of persons responsible for crimes
committed by both sides to the conflict."3 2 In 2003 and 2004, following
heightened tensions between the ICTR and the Rwandan
government over the issue, the Security Council called on Rwanda
"to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to
the ICTR, including on investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front. "3
The ICTR's Office of the Prosecutor first launched investigations
27. Id. at 162-67.
28. See PESKIN, supra note 26, at 177-84, 200-05, 212-22; Edmund Kagire,
Government Disappointed as ICTR Acquits Key 'Akazu' Member, THE NEW TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=14082&
article=22597; Kigali Unhappy Over Prosecutor's Decision Not to Appeal Against
Kabiligi, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.hirondellenews.
com/content/view/12193/531; Stephanie Nieuwoudt, Slow Progress at Rwandan
Tribunal, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (July 27, 2006),
http://iwpr.net/report-news/slow-progress-rwandan-tribunal; Rwanda Furious Over
Acquittal of Two Suspects, EAST AFRICAN (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/242686/-/t6wdvfz/-/index.html; Editorial, Rwanda: In
Whose Interest is ICTR Working? THE NEW TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200911190032.html; Rwanda Wants Acquitted Bagambiki
to Surrender in Order to Face Rape Trial, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (May 4,2006),
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/3702/135.
29. See PESKIN, supra note 26, at 207-24.
30. Id. at 162.
31. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
32. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution 955, 42, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995) (emphasis added).
33. See S.C. Res. 1503, T 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res.
1534, A 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
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into crimes committed by the RPF in February 1999.' With only six
months left before leaving office, then-Chief Prosecutor Louise
Arbour felt confident to open these "special investigations" without
fear of repercussions in her relationship with the Rwandan regime.
The real momentum, however, came under her successor, Carla Del
Ponte, between 2000 and 2002.36 During that time, a team of three
investigators led the Special Investigations in Kigali. Initially, they
gathered evidence on thirteen RPF massacres.3 ' However, they
quickly narrowed the investigation to three principal cases: massacres
committed in the southern province of Butare after the RPF gained
control of the country; killings in the town of Giti (well-known for
being one of the few places in Rwanda where genocide did not occur);
and the Kabgayi massacre of thirteen clergy and two civilians in June
1994.38
Del Ponte believed that securing Rwandan cooperation was
essential for successful investigations into crimes committed by the
RPF. For this reason, she met President Kagame in December 2000
and informed him that she intended to launch the "special
investigations."" Kagame initially agreed to cooperate.40 Several
days later, Del Ponte held a press conference and announced that she
might have an indictment ready by the end of 2001 - a statement she
later claimed was intended to prevent Kagame from "backtrack[ing]"
on his pledge of cooperation.41 However, in a later meeting, Kagame
went back on his commitment and told the Chief Prosecutor to focus
34. THIERRY CRUVELLIER, LE TRIBUNAL DES VAINCUS: UN NUREMBERG POUR
LE RWANDA? 240 (2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. CARLA DEL PONTE AND CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY'S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY 182 (2009); see also Filip Reyntjens, Remarks at the International
Conference Assessing Legacy of the ICTR, session 2, Geneva, at 19 (July 9, 2009),
available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlNews/events/july2009/SESSION2
.pdf.
38. See CRUVELLIER,supra note 34, at 241.
39. See DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 37, at 182-87; CRUVELLIER, supra note
34, at 240.
40. See DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 37, at 184; Former ICTR Prosecutor
Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at the International Conference Assessing Legacy of the
ICTR, session 2, Geneva, at 43 (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.unictr.org
/Portals/O/ EnglishlNews/events/july2009/SESSION2.pdf.
41. See DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 37, at 185.
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on genocide cases only.42
Cooperation on the "special investigations" stalled and remained
that way throughout 2001. In January 2002, the main genocide
survivors' organization, Ibuka, which had come under government
control in 2000, called on genocide survivors to boycott the Tribunal.43
Several months later, the Chief Prosecutor publicly criticized Rwanda
for lack of cooperation with the investigations into RPF crimes and
pledged to hand down indictments by the end of the year." The big
blow came in June 2002, when the Rwandan government imposed
burdensome travel restrictions that prevented prosecution witnesses
from going to Arusha to testify at the ICTR in genocide cases.45 This
move caused the suspension of three ICTR trials for lack of
witnesses,46 lasting several months and effectively blackmailing the
Tribunal into dropping investigations into RPF crimes. Preventing
access to witnesses had always been the Rwandan government's
greatest weapon against the ICTR because most prosecution
witnesses come from within Rwanda.47
The Prosecutor fought back the following month by informing
the U.N. Security Council of Rwandan efforts to block her
investigations.48 In response, Rwanda argued that the Special
Investigations into RPF crimes were "politically motivated" and "not
42. Del Ponte, Remarks at the International Conference, supra note 40.
43. See Letter from Ibuka President Antoine Mugesera and Avega President
Dancille Mukandoli to the ICTR Registrar, Mar. 6, 2002, and appendices (on file
with authors). Avega is a genocide survivors' organization for women; see also
Genocide Survivors Halt Cooperation with UN Tribunal, U.N. WIRE, Jan. 29, 2002,
available at http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20020129/23361_story.asp; INTERNATIO-
NAL CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION 12-13 (2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup
.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/053-rwanda-at-the-end-of-the-transition-
a-necessary-political-liberalisation.aspx.
44. See Chris McGreal, Genocide Tribunal Ready to Indict First Tutsis, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2002/apr/05/chrismcgreal; More Witnesses Boycott UN Tribunal for Rwanda,
HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.hirondellenews.com/content
/view/7834/26/.
45. See PESKIN, supra note 26, at 212-15.
46. Erik M0se, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 920, 939
(2005) (according to the former ICTR President M0se, the Tribunal lost
approximately 21 trial days as a result of Rwanda's suspended cooperation).
47. CRUVELLIER, supra note 34, at 241.
48. PESKIN, supra note 27, at 216-218.
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conducive to stability and national reconciliation in Rwanda."' 9 It
also attacked the Tribunal for corruption, mistreatment of witnesses,
and general incompetence.0 In September 2002, Del Ponte finally
relented and placed a hold on all special investigations.' Weeks
before, Del Ponte moved the Special Investigations team from Kigali
to Arusha for security reasons.52 The team never returned to Kigali
after that date.
The Security Council did not weigh in until a year later, in
August 2003, when it called on Rwanda "to intensify cooperation
with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on
investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army."5 4  The Security
Council's failure to respond more quickly and more forcefully gave
Rwanda the upper hand. The United States government also
attempted to broker a deal between the ICTR and the Rwandan
government in Washington in May 2003, by proposing that Rwanda
be given the first shot at trying RPF soldiers with the ICTR retaining
jurisdiction in the event that the proceedings were flawed." Del
Ponte states that she never agreed to this arrangement, but others
claim she did." In the end, no agreement was signed, and the
negotiations collapsed.
Del Ponte was removed from her duties at the ICTR in
September 2003, partly as a result of her insistence on prosecuting
RPF crimes, but also because of the new "completion strategy"
imposed on the Tribunal by the Security Council." The completion
49. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the President of the
Security Council, 1.5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/842 (July 26, 2002).
50. Id.
51. CRUVELLIER, supra note 34, at 242.
52. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Tribunal Pinal International pour le Rwanda:
Pragmatisme de Rigueur, 69 RAPPORT AFRIQUE 1 (2003), available at http:
//www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ICG,,RWA,,3f97ca554,0.html.
53. Id.; Email correspondence between the authors and Thierry Cruvellier (Feb.
24, 2010) (on file with authors).
54. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 33, 3.
55. DEL PONTE & SUDATIC, supra note 37, at 231; Pierre Prosper, former U.S.
Ambassador-at-large for war crimes, Remarks at the International Conference
Assessing Legacy of the ICTR, session 2, Geneva, at 28 (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www. unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlNews/events/july2009/SESSION2.pdf.
56. See Pierre Prosper, Remarks at the International Conference, supra note 55.
Compare DEL PONTE & SUDATIC, supra note 37, at 233 with CRUVELLIER, supra note
34, at 243.
57. The Rwandan government had campaigned for her removal due to the RPF
[Vol. 34:158
The Impunity Gap
strategy initially set deadlines of 2004 for investigations, 2008 for
trials, and 2010 for appeals, which necessitated a full-time prosecutor
18to focus on finishing the Rwandan cases. In order to meet the
deadlines, the Security Council encouraged the Tribunal "to transfer
cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused to competent
national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda."' 9  The
Security Council appointed former Gambian Supreme Court Justice
Hassan Bubacar Jallow as the Tribunal's new chief prosecutor.
Prosecutor Jallow revived the Special Investigations in the spring
of 2004, although he made no public statements regarding the move
and did nothing to endanger the progress of the genocide cases at the
Tribunal.' The investigations moved slowly, which was a useful
strategy to keep Kigali guessing as to the Office of the Prosecutor's
intentions. In the end, though, the investigative team never pursued
the RPF files as vigorously as it had under Del Ponte.
IV. The Rwandan Test Case
A. The Decision to Transfer RPF Cases to Rwanda
On June 4, 2008, the ICTR Prosecutor took many people by
investigations. Marlise Simons, Rwanda is Said to Seek New Prosecutor for War
Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/07/28/world/rwanda-is-said-to-seek-new-prosecutor-for-war-crimes-court.html.
According to Del Ponte, the U.S. and U.K. supported her removal and the dropping
of RPF investigations. DEL PONTE & SUDATIC, supra note 37, at 234-39; see also
PESKIN, supra note 26, at 220-22. However, others observed that Del Ponte had
unrealistic plans to prosecute sizable numbers of genocide suspects at a time when
the U.N., U.S., and U.K. were eager to begin shutting down operations. Interview
with Thierry Cruveillier, in Geneva (July 10, 2009); see also KINGSLEY CHIEDU
MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 133 (2005)
(observing that "Del Ponte was initially politically tone-deaf" about the completion
strategy).
58. Until that time, the U.N. had appointed a single prosecutor to handle both
the ICTY and the ICTR cases. The deadline for completion of ICTR trials has since
been extended to the end of 2010. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 33, 1 7; S.C. Res. 1878,
1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1878 (July 7, 2009); see also ICTR and ICTY Ask for More
Cooperation to Arrest Fugitives, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/12963/26/.
59. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 33, at pmbl.
60. PESKIN, supra note 26, at 225-28; see also Hassan B. Jallow, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Chief Prosecutor, Remarks at the International Conference
Assessing Legacy of the ICTR, session 5, Geneva, at 45 (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English/News/events/july2009/SESSION5.pdf.
61. PESKIN, supra note 26, at 225-28.
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surprise when he informed the Security Council of his decision to
transfer one of his office's investigations into RPF crimes to Rwanda
for domestic prosecution. 62 The case involved the massacre of an
archbishop, two bishops, ten clergy members, and two civilians
(including a nine-year-old boy) in a novitiate in Kabgayi.63 The ICTR
Prosecutor has the right to transfer investigative files to the
government of Rwanda without seeking a court order, so long as the
case has not reached the indictment stage. Prosecutor Jallow had
already transferred a batch of thirty-five investigative files on the
genocide to Rwanda." However, this was the first time he entrusted
the Rwandan government with prosecuting its own RPF forces, a
matter for which the government obviously had much less incentive
to seek justice. Prosecutor Jallow assured the Security Council that
his office would monitor the trial closely and would reassert
jurisdiction over the case if the proceedings proved unsatisfactory. 65
One week later, four Rwandan officers were arrested and domestic
proceedings began in Rwanda.
Ironically, at the time of the Prosecutor's announcement, the
Tribunal had just denied a request to transfer indicted genocide
suspects to Rwandan courts because of concerns that they would not
receive fair trials.' The Tribunal concluded, among other things, that
defense witnesses might be unwilling to testify for fear of threats,
harassment, arrest or accusations of "genocide ideology."" The court
62. U.N. SCOR 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 2008)
(statement by Hassan B. Jallow, ICTR Chief Prosecutor).
63. Id.
64. Letter from Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR, to Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch 2 (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/2009_06_RwandaJallowRes
ponse 0.pdf. Fifteen of these cases were transferred between June 2004 and June
2005. See U.N. SCOR 60th Sess., 5199th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5199 (June 13,
2005) (statement by Martin Ngoga, Rwandan Deputy-Prosecutor General).
65. U.N. SCOR 60th Sess., supra note 64, at 39.
66. Four Rwandan Soldiers Arrested to Face Trial Over 1994 Killing,
HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (June 12, 2008), http://www.hirondellenews.com/
content/view/6128/26/.
67. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 96-36-R11bis, Decision on the Case
of Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 28,
2008).
68. Id. 1$ 59-66. For critiques of how Rwanda has used vague accusations of
"genocide ideology" to stifle political activity, press freedom, and civil society, see
ARTICLE 19, COMMENT ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY OF RWANDA (2009); FRONT LINE RWANDA,
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also concluded that the Rwandan judiciary was not independent of
political interference. Since that time, the Tribunal has denied five
additional requests for genocide suspects to be transferred to
Rwanda.70  Several foreign jurisdictions, including the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Finland, dismissed requests for
extradition on similar grounds in 2008 and 2009." Sweden has been
the one exception, granting an extradition request in mid-2009.72
While all these extradition requests involved genocide cases, the same
concerns apply equally - or with even greater force - to war crimes
trials against RPF officers whenever a witness might testify against
the government line.
B. The Trial in Rwanda
The clergy massacre was an obvious choice for Rwanda to
DISAPPEARANCES, ARRESTS, THREATS, INTIMIDATION AND CO-OPTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS DEFENDERS, 2001- 2004 12-30 (2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1,
at 34-43; LARS WALDORF, Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology,
Reconciliation, and Rescuers, 11 J. GENOCIDE RES. 101-25 (2009).
69. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 96-36-R11bis, Decision on the Case
of Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, 38-48
(May 28, 2008). The trial court finding was overturned on appeal on Oct. 8, 2008.
Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 96-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, 26-31 (Oct. 8, 2008).
70. Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-Rllbis, Decision on
Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 6, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Hatekegimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda (June
19, 2008); Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-Rllbis, Decision on
Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Dec. 16, 2008). The denial
of transfer in all five ICTR cases has been affirmed on appeal.
71. In the U.K., the High Court of Justice denied extradition of four genocide
suspects - Vincent Bajinya, Charles Munyaneza, Emmanuel Nteziryayo, and C61estin
Ugirashebuja - in April 2009. French courts refused the extradition of suspects
Marcel Bivugabagabo in October 2008, Isaac Kamali in December 2008, and Claver
Kamana in January 2009. In Germany, courts rejected two separate extradition
requests for Callixte Mbarushimana and Onesphore Rwabukomba in November
2008. Finnish courts denied Rwanda's request for extradition of Frangois Bazaramba
in February 2009. For a broader discussion of Rwandan extradition cases, see
REDRESS AND AFRICAN RIGHTS, EXTRADITING GENOCIDE SUSPECTS FROM EUROPE
To RWANDA: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (2008), available at http://www.
redress.org/downloads/publications/ExtraditionReportFinalVersionSept 08.pdf.
72. The decision has been suspended pending a review by the European Court of
Human Rights. Agence France Presse. European Court Halts Rwandan Genocide
Suspect Extradition, THE LOCAL (July 16, 2009), http://www.thelocal.se/
20736/20090716/.
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prosecute. First, it was one of the most notorious RPF massacres
because it involved the killing of several of the highest-ranking
members of Rwanda's Catholic Church." Second, the incident was
already well-known, and the RPF had accepted responsibility within
days of it happening.74 Third, the small number of victims made the
slaying look like an isolated and unique incident, rendering it more
difficult to argue that the killings constituted a crime against
humanity, which requires evidence of "widespread and systematic
attacks on civilians."" Finally, a Rwandan trial might have lessened
the blow of a Spanish court case, which remains pending, against forty
military officers, which includes one of the defendants in the Kabgayi
massacre (General Wilson Gumisiriza).
The trial ran intermittently from June 17 to October 24, 2008,
opening with guilty pleas from the two lower-ranking officers,
Captain John Butera and retired Captain Dieudonn6 Rukeba, and
ending with the acquittals of the two higher-ranking officers, General
Wilson Gumisiriza and Major Wilson Ukwishaka." Despite its
potential significance, the trial attracted little interest from foreign
diplomats and media outlets in Rwanda. The ICTR sent observers to
the proceedings on only a handful of days.
Both the military prosecutor and defense counsel presented the
same version of events: Two renegade soldiers were overtaken with
emotion at the dead bodies they were finding in churches and agreed
to assist a fellow soldier to avenge the deaths of his Tutsi family
members (who had been allegedly under the care of the bishops at
Kabgayi).7 ' The only issue in dispute was whether the two
73. DES FORGES, supra note 6, at 714.
74. Id.
75. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 31.
76. Spanish courts cannot exercise universal jurisdiction if Rwanda has effectively
investigated and prosecuted the case itself. Note and Comment, The Spanish
Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials, 6 J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1008 (2008)
77. Human Rights Watch, Trial Observation Notes, Rwandan Military Court,
Kigali (Aug. 19-20, Sep. 2, 10, 24, and Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch Trial Notes] (on file with author).
78. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch to
Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR 3 (May 26, 2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/26/letter-prosecutor-international-criminaltribun
al-rwandaregarding-prosecution-rpf-c.
79. Prosecutor v. Gumisiriza, Case No. RP 0151/087TM, Trial Judgment, 17-
22, 33-37, 41-45, 49-50, 52-53, 64-66 [Rwandan Military Court, Nyamirambo/Kigali]
(Oct. 24, 2008).
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commanding officers, Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka, could be held
criminally liable under the doctrine of command responsibility -
whether they "knew or had reason to know"a that their subordinates
were about to kill the clergy or had killed the clergy and "failed to
take 'necessary and reasonable measures' to prevent or punish",8 that
crime.'
The prosecutor pointed to evidence that when the clergy were
being transported to Gakurazo a crowd of displaced genocide
survivors booed them, shouting, "See the Interahamwe [the genocidal
militia]!"" Major Ukwishaka admitted to hearing this, but said he did
not take it seriously because he had no reason to think his own troops
would commit vengeance.' General Gumisiriza testified that he
could not have foreseen such a risk to the clergy because "we had
never known such an incident since the war broke out [in October
1990]."" He also stated that he was some ten to fourteen kilometers
away when the massacre occurred, that he immediately ordered an
investigation, and that he had Major Ukwishaka (temporarily)
arrested as part of that investigation.8 Responding to a question from
the presiding judge, he claimed that "Our soldiers had been well
trained well in advance on humanitarian law. I also had confidence in
them, especially seeing as we had never known a violation of
humanitarian law anywhere we had been."" Gumisiriza's defense
lawyer also stressed the General had not, and could not have, known
the clergy were at risk because "killing civilians was not a generalized
practice within the [RPF]."1
The military prosecutor presented four prosecution witnesses: a
80. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgment, 791 (Nov. 28,
2007). According to the Appeals Chamber, "[t]he 'reason to know' standard is met
when the accused had 'some general information in his possession, which would put
him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates."'
81. Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence,
630 (Feb. 25, 2004). According to the Trial Chamber, "[t]he degree of the superior's
effective control guides the assessment of whether the individual took reasonable
measures to prevent, stop, or punish a subordinates' crime."
82. See Prosecutor v. Gumisiriza, Case No. RP 0151/08/TM, Trial Judgment, TT
123-27, 129-38 [Rwandan Military Court, Nyamirambo/Kigali] (Oct. 24,2008).
83. Human Rights Watch Trial Notes, supra note 77 (Aug. 20,2008).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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soldier and a young woman who were inside the hall when the
massacre occurred, and a soldier and clergyman who were outside the
hall. The clergyman testified that the murdered clergy came to
Gakurazo voluntarily because it had water, hygiene and more security
than Ruhango." He also praised Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka for their
compassionate investigation of the massacre." The young woman
who took the stand was serving a seventeen-year sentence for
involvement in the genocide.1 She testified that she did not see the
killers and that the RPF soldiers had given them a sense of security.'
The testimony of the two soldiers under Ukwishaka's command at the
time added very little, as both were unable to identify the killers and
did not provide any information related to the issue of Ukwishaka's
command responsibility.93
The two captains who pled guilty presented eight witnesses to
support their defense of provocation. Those witnesses testified about
the Catholic Church's complicity in the genocide, and about the role
allegedly played by some of the murdered clergy.94 The defense
offered no evidence that the family of their fellow soldier had actually
been killed at Kabgayi while under the protection of these clergy.
The two commanding officers, Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka, testified in
their own defence, but did not call any witnesses to corroborate their
claims.
Overall, the prosecution case was weak and, as mentioned,
consistent with the defense's theory of the case. One of the
defendants even invoked the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
in his defense.95 The prosecutor rarely challenged the defendants'
version of events and introduced evidence that the massacre had not
been planned in advance. Rather than questioning why the RPF had
moved the clergy to the remote hamlet of Gakurazo away from
international scrutiny, the prosecutor adopted the defense line that
the clergy themselves had requested the move to Gakurazo for their
89. Id. (Sep. 2, 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Prosecutor v. Gumisiriza, Case No. RP 0151/08/TM, Trial Judgment, 1 98-
117 [Rwandan Military Court, Nyamirambo/Kigali] (Oct. 24, 2008).
95. Id. 1 128.
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safety and well-being.96 Finally, the prosecutor failed to make a case
for command responsibility and failed to challenge the defendant's
assertion that "we had never known a violation of humanitarian law
anywhere we had been," despite the existence of public reports
indicating that RPF soldiers had killed civilians, including priests,
beginning in April 1994. 1
Consequently, the military court acquitted the two commanding
officers. It found that the officers had no reason to suspect their
subordinates might kill the clergy." The court rejected the military
prosecutor's claim that the officers should have taken precautions
because of the Tutsi refugees' insults against the clergy." The court
repeatedly stressed that this massacre was unique." The acquittal,
like the military prosecutor's case, rested on the false premise that
RPF soldiers had not already committed similar massacres
throughout Rwanda in 1994. Furthermore, the court (and
prosecutor) ignored the commanding officers' apparent failure to
punish their subordinates - even though failure to punish is evidence
of command responsibility.
As for the two subordinates, the court rejected their defense of
provocation on the grounds that they had no links to the murdered
clergy (i.e., none of their family members had been injured by those
clergy)."o' The court found them guilty of murder in violation of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Rwandan
Penal Code.'m However, it found several mitigating factors - their
guilty pleas, the lack of premeditation, the absence of prior criminal
records, and the circumstances (i.e., the corpses they had seen in
churches) - and sentenced them to eight years each."o'
In late February 2009, a military appeals court upheld the
acquittals but reduced the sentences against the soldiers who had
96. Id. IT 18-19.
97. DES FORGES, supra note 6, at 711; see also ANDRE GUICHAOUA, RWANDA,
DE LA GUERRE AU GENOCIDE: LES POLITIQUES CRIMINELLES AU RWANDA (1990-
1994) 244-245 (2010).
98. Prosecutor v. Gumisiriza, Case No. RP 0151/08/TM, Trial Judgment, 1 150-
64 [Rwandan Military Court, Nyamirambo/Kigali] (Oct. 24, 2008).
99. Id. 154, 158,163.
100. Id. IT 155, 159.
101. Id. IT 165-66.
102. Id. 167.
103. Id. 1 168-69.
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confessed from eight to five years." With respect to command
responsibility, the appeals court ruled that a person can only be
punished where there is clear and convincing evidence of notoriety of
the crime and the widespread nature of similar crimes. In this case,
the court concluded that the two commanders could not have known
that their subordinates were going to commit a crime.0 o The appeals
court, like the trial court, did not consider the commanders' apparent
failure to punish their subordinates.
C. Evidence Not Presented at Trial
The military prosecutor did not present probative evidence
indicating that the massacre was a planned RPF military action,
despite the fact that such evidence was available. This evidence,
based largely on testimony from witnesses, was gathered by Human
Rights Watch and is believed to be in the hands of the ICTR
prosecutor.' 6 We have reason to believe that the ICTR also turned
over a summary of its evidence to the Rwandan prosecutor's office.
Our investigation reveals that the RPF had the thirteen clergymen in
its custody since June 2, 1994, when the RPF's 157th battalion, under
the command of Colonel Fred Ibingira, took control of the area. The
clergy were moved from Kabgayi to Ruhango that same evening,
allegedly for their safety.
The clergy were moved from Kabgayi to a village near Ruhango
in the late hours of June 2, allegedly for their protection. They were
then moved from that village to a remote novitiate in Gakurazo (near
Kabgayi) on the morning of June 5, 1994. Both Kabgayi, which was
centrally located on the main road, and Ruhango, where the 157th
battalion had provisional headquarters at the time, were under
international scrutiny, which meant that the clergy were in relative
safety. Gakurazo, on the other hand, was removed from any of the
104. Prosecutor v. Wilson Gumisiriza, Case No. RPA 0062/08/HCM, Appeals
Judgment [Rwandan Military High Court, Nyarugunga/Kigali] (Feb. 25, 2009); see
also Edwin Musoni, Gumisiriza Wins Appeal, THE NEw TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13818&article=13710.
105. Prosecutor v. Wilson Gumisiriza, Case No. RPA 0062/08/HCM, Appeals
Judgment, 42 [Rwandan Military High Court, Nyarugunga/Kigali] (Feb. 25, 2009).
106. The following is a composite account in order to protect the identity of the
witnesses. The evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch included testimony from
several witnesses who told the organization that they have spoken with ICTR
investigators. Human Rights Watch also collaborated with the ICTR on this and
other RPF cases over the past decade.
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main roads and had few residents in the area. The move took place
on the orders of the RPF, not at the request of the clergy, as alleged
during trial. Commanders had sent away RPF soldiers who had been
guarding the novitiate and brought in a team of military intelligence
officers to execute the killings.
That evening, just after dusk, an RPF officer summoned the
clergymen to a meeting in the dining hall, allegedly to discuss
security, and ordered all others at the novitiate to stay in their rooms.
The officer had a bodyguard with him, suggesting that he held at least
moderate rank. The meeting was interrupted when the RPF officer
realized that not all the requested clergy were present, notably the
archbishop of Kigali who was praying in the chapel and had not been
informed of the meeting." The officer sent someone to fetch the
archbishop, and the meeting reconvened once he and another priest
joined the others in the dining hall. Shortly after the RPF officer
resumed speaking, several intelligence officers entered the room
abruptly and opened fire on those present. One of the soldiers
pushed the three Tutsi women who had been accompanying the
clergy out of harm's way. A fourth woman had already left the room.
Unfortunately, a young boy aged eight or nine years at the time
remained seated on the lap of an elderly priest. A twenty-year-old
who had been taken in by the bishop of Kabgayi a few years earlier
was also in the room. At least one witness saw armed soldiers outside
the dining hall with guns pointed in through the open windows,
although none fired shots at the clergy. The shooting began and
continued until a whistle blew, according to one witness. No other
shots were heard after that.
Shortly after the killings, the officer in charge summoned others
at the novitiate to gather in the courtyard. He explained that soldiers
from neighboring areas who were upset about the deaths of their
family members in Kabgayi had killed the clergy. He said that one
soldier had been shot by fellow soldiers immediately after the killings
and that two other shooters escaped. He reassured those assembled
that they would be found. The officer took the group several meters
away and pointed his flashlight at an object on the ground, saying it
was the body of the assassin. It was dark and the light was insufficient
for witnesses to determine if it was an actual corpse or merely a pile
of military clothes. He proceeded to take the group into the dining
107. Archbishop Nsengiyumva had close ties with the Habyarimana regime and
was therefore an important target for the RPF.
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hall to see the victims' bodies but only allowed people to observe the
remains for a very brief time. At least one witness was taken aback
by how severely damaged the bodies were, describing several of the
victims' bodies as literally having been torn to shreds.
The evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch suggests that
several witnesses at the Rwandan trial gave inaccurate testimony in
part and omitted certain facts. Other relevant witnesses known to the
military prosecutor were not called to testify. These errors, combined
with the failure to present the above information, which is believed to
have been in the hands of the military prosecutor's office, suggest that
the prosecutor did not pursue an accurate theory of the case and did
not charge the accused to the full extent of the evidence. The
prosecutor also failed to indict other RPF officers known to have had
an active role in the massacre.
D. The ICTR Prosecutor's Review of the Case
Prosecutor Jallow had assured the Security Council that his
office would monitor the Rwandan proceedings closely, and that he
would reassert jurisdiction over the case if the proceedings were not
"effective, expeditious, fair and open to the public."'08 Yet, his office
sent Tribunal observers for only two preliminary detention hearings,
one day of trial testimony, closing arguments, and the verdict.'"
Jallow also failed to provide a timely assessment of the trial. After
the appeals judgment was handed down in late February 2009, Jallow
did not provide an evaluation until specifically questioned by
members of the Security Council on June 4, 2009. He then stated,
"The report of my monitors indicates that the standards of fair trial
were observed."',o He did not provide any other details or analysis,
either at the time or subsequently. Human Rights Watch met with
Jallow and others in the Office of the Prosecutor in Arusha in March
2009 to raise concerns over the case. Of particular concern was the
108. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., supra note 62, at 11.
109. See Letter from Kenneth Roth, supra note 78. The Prosecutor disputed this
contention and stated that his office later received a written record of the
proceedings and a video recording; see also Letter from Hassan Jallow, supra note 64;
Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch to Hassan B.
Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.hr
w.org/node/85068.
110. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., supra note 5, at 33; see also Leslie Haskell, Remarks
at the Geneva Conference (July 11, 2009), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0
/EnglishlNews/events/july2009/SESSION2.pdf.
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Rwandan prosecutor's failure to present other evidence suggesting
that the massacre had been a planned military operation and to go
after more senior officials involved in the operation.
There are serious doubts about both the fairness and
genuineness of this trial. First, Rwanda's military courts are not
independent and impartial. Even the civil courts, where donors have
focused their assistance to the justice system, remain subject to
executive influence, particularly in politically sensitive cases. i
Consequently, the U.K. High Court of Justice expressed strong
concerns over the Rwandan judiciary's independence and impartiality
and declined to extradite several genocide suspects back to
Rwanda.112 Second, Rwanda did not "diligently prosecute" the clergy
massacre. The military prosecutor called only four prosecution
witnesses, all of whom gave testimony favorable to the defendants
and their version of events. This was hardly surprising; after all, the
ICTR Chambers and U.K. High Court found a real likelihood that
witnesses in Rwanda would be too fearful to defend genocide
suspects - something that is much less politically sensitive than
accusing RPF soldiers of war crimes. Finally, the two sentences
handed down in this case do not reflect the gravity of the crimes
111. The U.S. State Department raised concerns about judicial independence in its
2008 human rights report:
... the judiciary operated in most cases without government interference;
however, there were constraints on judicial independence. Government
officials sometimes attempted to influence individual cases, primarily in
gacaca cases. There were reports that some members of the executive
branch considered it appropriate to call judges to discuss ongoing cases
privately and to express executive preferences.
During the year the country passed a constitutional amendment that reduces
most judicial appointments from life to four or five years, potentially limiting
judicial independence.
U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2008
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: RWANDA (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119019.htm; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: RWANDA
(Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 44-69; Lars Waldorf, A Justice 'Trickle
Down': Rwanda's First Postgenocide President on Trial, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF
STATE 151 (Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009) (describing the unfair trial of
former President Pasteur Bizimungu and his co-accused). However, Sam Rugege,
now Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, claims that "Rwanda has a
government that respects the principle of the rule of law and that does not interfere
in the judicial tasks of the courts." Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda,
19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 412, 423 (2006).
112. Brown v. The Government of Rwanda, [2009] EWHC 770, [119, 121] (Eng.).
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committed, though they are consistent with the light sentences for
murder handed down by other military courts to RPF soldiers."'
Given the serious shortcomings in the prosecution, Prosecutor
Jallow should have reasserted jurisdiction over the case in keeping
with his earlier commitment to the Security Council. Instead, he
asserted the trial was fair without providing any evidence or
reasoning. He also made clear that he has no intention of pursuing
RPF indictments before the close of the Tribunal."4
V. Comparisons with Other International and Hybrid
Tribunals
The ICTR's failure to prosecute RPF crimes stands in stark
contrast to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
which have prosecuted perpetrators from all sides of their respective
conflicts and successfully targeted high-ranking government officials.
The Security Council established the ICTY in February 1993 to
prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
committed in the Balkans after 1991, when the former Yugoslavia
began unraveling."' Like the ICTR, the ICTY has struggled with
issues of state cooperation in gathering documentary evidence,
gaining access to witnesses, and apprehending indicted persons."'
The ICTY resorted to raising the issue with the Security Council and
secured two separate resolutions calling on the states of the former
Yugoslavia to cooperate with the tribunal."' What proved far more
113. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 104-09.
114. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., supra note 5, at 33 (at the June 2009 briefing, Jallow
told the Security Council that his office had no other RPF indictments ready).
115. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
116. ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated that "serious flaws were reported in
the cooperation of most states of the former Yugoslavia until late 2005, and neither
Serbia and Montenegro nor Bosnia and Herzegovina were found to be fully and
unconditionally cooperating with the Tribunal. Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and
Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International Level: The Experience of the
ICTY, 4 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 556 (2006); see generally PESKIN, supra note 26,
at 29-148, (2008).
117. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 33, 1 2 (calling on "all States, especially Serbia
and Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the Republika
Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, to intensify cooperation with and render all
necessary assistance to the ICTY, particularly to bring Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic, as well as Ante Gotovina and all other indictees to the ICTY and calls on
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effective, however, were the nonjudicial means employed by the
ICTY and the conditioning of European Union membership
discussions on state cooperation with the tribunal - particularly with
respect to Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro."' Del Ponte later stated
that "90% of all indictees brought to justice [before the ICTY] are a
direct result of conditionality applied by the EU.""
Despite the obstacles to state cooperation, the ICTY managed to
issue 161 indictments against all factions in the Croatian, Bosnian and
Kosovo wars. In Croatia, it issued indictments for more than half a
dozen members of the Croatian army and a handful of Croatian Serbs
and Serbs from the Yugoslav army. In Bosnia, the tribunal targeted
more than twenty-five Bosnian Croats, eighty-five Bosnian Serbs, as
well as more than a dozen members of the Bosnian Muslim
government force and Yugoslav army officers. In Kosovo, the
tribunal went after more than half a dozen Kosovo Albanians and
eight Serbs in the Yugoslav army. The tribunal also issued
indictments against two Macedonians and three Montenegrins.'20
In May 1999, the ICTY handed down the tribunal's most
important indictment against Serbian President Slobodan Milogevic.12 1
It was the first time that a war crimes tribunal had indicted a sitting
head of state. 122 The indictment provoked international controversy
as some Western governments feared that the indictment might not
only hinder peace negotiations with Milogevic, but might also
intensify the conflict in Kosovo.123 Neither prediction came true. It
was a long and tumultuous road to Milogevic's final arrest in April
2001 (after losing the presidential election in October 2000), but again
these and all other at-large indictees of the ICTY to surrender to the ICTY."); see
also S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 33, 1 1.
118. See Carla Del Ponte, supra note 116, at 556-57.
119. See Letter from Human Rights Watch to Javier Solana, European Union
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Ollie Rehn,
Commissioner, and Jos6 Manuel Barroso, Commission President (Sept. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/09/10/eu-must-maintain-insistence-full-
serbian-cooperation-icty.
120. Key Figures of ICTY Cases, UNITED NATIONS INT'L TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures.
121. See Press Release: International Criminal Tribune for the Former Yugoslavia,
President Milosevic and Four other Senior FRY Officials Indicted for Murder,
Persecution and Deportation in Kosovo, (May 27, 1999), available at http://
www.icty.org/sid/7765.
122. PESKIN,supra note 26, at 57.
123. Id.
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international pressure proved crucial to securing justice. The U.S.
threatened to block nearly 100 million dollars of financial aid to the
country if Milogevic was not arrested and turned over to the ICTY.124
This strategy led to Milogevic's transfer to The Hague on June 29,
2001, a watershed moment for justice and a day that many believed
would never happen.125
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) came into existence
in 2002 to prosecute "those who bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law" for crimes committed after November 30, 1996.126
Unlike the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, the Special Court is a
hybrid tribunal with both national and international staff and judges,
and is located in Freetown, Sierra Leone.' In contrast to Serbia,
Croatia, and Rwanda, Sierra Leone supported the court from the
outset. 28
The Special Court has prosecuted all sides of the Sierra Leonean
conflict, despite a narrower mandate and less funding than the ICTR.
The Special Court issued indictments against thirteen individuals,
including six leaders of the rebel movement, the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF); four persons who led the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which allied itself with the RUF
after 1997; and three persons who headed the Civil Defense Force
(CDF), which fought on the side of the government during the war.'29
The most notable indictees were a minister in the Sierra Leonean
124. Id. at 68-69.
125. See PESKIN, supra, note 26, at 69-70; see also Milosevic Jailed in The Hague,
CNN, June 29, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/28
/milosevic.court/index.html; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Weighing the Evidence: Lessons
from the Slobodan Milosevic Trial (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/
en/reports/2006/12/13/weighing-evidence-0.
126. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.sc-st.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndlMJeEw%3d&tabid=176.
127. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/104.pdf (noting other differences include the
fact that it was established by agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone rather than by a Security Council resolution, as in the
case of the ICTR and ICTY, and is funded by contributions from more than thirty
countries).
128. Telephone Interview with former Special Court for Sierra Leone
Investigator, International Center for Transitional Justice (Feb. 2, 2010).
129. See Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Model in International Criminal Justice:
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 23 (2008).
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government and the president of Liberia.
The arrest of Sam Hinga Norman, Interior Minister in the
Kabbah government, was a shock to many in Sierra Leone, as he was
considered a hero for having brought together traditional hunters
from the Mende region to protect civilians from attacks by soldiers
and rebels.30 Norman was arrested in his ministerial office, a
"courageous" move according to former SCSL prosecutor Stephen
Rapp."' His high-ranking position and perceived ability to mobilize
former CDF forces led the Special Court to take precautionary
security measures, including the development of a U.N. contingency
plan for evacuating court staff and accused persons, the holding of his
arraignment and other court appearances in closed session, and the
refusal to disclose his place of detention. 132
Norman's arrest and prosecution did not cause unrest in the
country. On the contrary, local civil society groups reported that the
case enhanced local understanding of the court's mandate, and
established the court as qualitatively different from "business as
usual" in Sierra Leone, where judicial matters have been
characterized by pervasive corruption.' Unfortunately, Norman died
in February 2007, six months before the case was concluded. The trial
court convicted his co-accused, CDF members Moinina Fofana and
Allieu Kondewa, of war crimes and sentenced them to six and eight
years respectively."
Another significant moment came in June 2003 when Liberian
President Charles Taylor was indicted."' Two months later, he
stepped down from power and took exile in Nigeria under an
arrangement brokered by the U.S. and the U.K."' However, the
SCSL prosecutor refused to accept this arrangement and launched an
international campaign to have him turned over to the court to face
130. See Telephone Interview, supra note 128.
131. Rapp, supra note 129, at 24.
132. See id.
133. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE 18-19 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports
/2004/09/07/bringing-justice-special-court-sierra-leone.
134. See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL 04-14-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007);
see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL 04-14-T, Sentencing Judgment, at 34
(Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=7U8%2f
VrPndPg%3d&tabid=175.
135. Rapp, supra note 129, at 26.
136. Id.
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justice. Human rights groups and other nongovernmental
organizations joined the campaign and lobbied the U.S. and Nigeria
to arrest Taylor. Not long after Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became
president of Liberia in January 2006, she requested the return of
Taylor to Liberia and secured Nigeria's cooperation. 13 7 Taylor was
finally handed over to the SCSL in March 2006, "a day that few Sierra
Leoneans thought they would ever witness" as Rapp recalled."
The ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone have
prosecuted crimes committed by all sides of the conflicts.
Furthermore, they both prosecuted sitting heads of state and
government ministers in the face of predictions that this would
destabilize fragile post-conflict states - predictions that did not come
to pass. By contrast, the international community has not been as
supportive or insistent on evenhanded prosecutions at the ICTR for
two reasons. First, many foreign governments continue to feel guilt at
having failed to stop the genocide and, in an effort to compensate for
past wrongs, pour financial aid into the country with little or no
human rights conditionality.'39 Second, some donor governments fear
that seeking accountability for RPF crimes might undermine the
relative stability in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This view is short-sighted and fails to recognize that the Rwandan
government can be moved by international pressure, as evidenced by
domestic judicial reforms made to allow the transfer and extradition
of genocide suspects from the ICTR and other states. It also fails to
take into consideration that the RPF's impunity may well have
contributed to violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.'o
137. See Liberia Seeks End to Taylor Exile, BBC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4817106.stm.
138. Rapp, supra note 129, at 28.
139. See Rachel Hayman, MILKING THE Cow: NEGOTIATING OWNERSHIP OF AID
AND SEE POLICY IN RWANDA (2007); see also Eugenia Zorbas, Aid Dependence and
Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox, in RECONSTRUCTING
RWANDA: STATE BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Scott
Straus & Lars Waldorf, eds., forthcoming).
140. The Rwandan army, consisting largely of former RPF soldiers, committed
grave human rights violations against Hutu refugees and other Hutu living in the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996 and 1997. According to a
report issued by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, these crimes may have amounted to "genocide." UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE
DOCUMENTING THE MOST SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO BETWEEN MARCH 1993 AND JUNE 2003 (Aug.
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VI. Consequences of the ICTR's Failure
to Prosecute RPF Crimes
The ICTR has achieved considerable success in bringing to
justice those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide. However,
failing to address the RPF's killing of some thirty thousand civilians in
1994 will have significant and far-reaching consequences both in
Rwanda and in the larger international context. First, it has resulted
in one-sided or victor's justice that does nothing to advance
reconciliation efforts within Rwanda or deter future violence in
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Second, it may
prevent an accurate historical record from being established and may
open the door to revisionism. Third, it may have weakened efforts at
enhancing domestic accountability mechanisms. Finally, it may
undermine the credibility of and justification for international
criminal justice.
A. Victor's Justice
Modern international criminal tribunals strive to distinguish
themselves from the legacy of Nuremberg, where the victorious
powers of World War II prosecuted prominent leaders of the Nazi
regime but no members of the Allied forces. Both the ICTY and the
SCSL have broken from the "victor's justice" model by prosecuting
both the winning and losing sides.
The ICTR's failure to prosecute the RPF victors has led several
scholars and human rights organizations to criticize the Tribunal for
rendering victor's justice.14' Even the former President and former
2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ca99bc22.html.
141. See, e.g., CRUVELLIER, supra note 34, at 245-50; PESKIN, supra note 26, at 207-
08; Lars Waldorf, 'A Mere Pretense of Justice': Complementarity, Sham Trials, and
Victor's Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT'L LAW J. 1221, 1272 (2010);
Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm? 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 977, 980 (2005); Howard French, Kagame's Hidden War in the Congo,
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Sept. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23054; Rwanda: Tribunal's Work Incomplete,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.hrw.orglen/news/
2009/08/17/rwanda-tribunal-s-work-incomplete; Rwanda: Tribunal Risks Supporting
'Victor's Justice,' HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2009) http://www.hrw.
org/en/news/2009/06/01/rwanda-tribunal-risks-supporting-victor-sjustice; Rwanda
Tribunal Should Pursue Justice for RPF Crimes, Human RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 12,
2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/12/rwanda-tribunal-should-pursue-justice-
rpf-crimes; Letter from Human Rights Watch to the ICTR Prosecutor, "ICTR:
Address Crimes Committed by the RPF," (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/1 1/ictr-address-crimes-committed-rpf; Letter
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Prosecutor of the ICTR have publicly voiced concern that
perceptions of victor's justice will taint the ICTR's legitimacy and
legacy.142 This concern over victor's justice critique is aimed not at
parity (i.e., indicting an equal number of suspects from each side of
the conflict) but at impartiality. Prosecuting all sides to a conflict
demonstrates that a court is even-handed in dispensing justice and is
an impartial arbiter of facts. Prosecuting all sides to a conflict would
ensure that a court is seen as treating victims impartially and insisting
that no one is above the law.143
Tolerance of impunity can also lead to renewed cycles of
violence "by implicitly permitting unlawful acts and by creating an
atmosphere of distrust and revenge."'" In Rwanda, several years of
government-sponsored violence and a lack of accountability for pre-
1994 killings were a significant contributing factor to the genocide. In
effect, the violence between 1990 and 1993 by the Rwandan Hutu-led
government was a testing of the waters to determine just how much
violence would be tolerated before the international community
would react. 45  In a similar vein, the failure to bring certain RPF
soldiers to justice for crimes committed in 1994 has encouraged
serious human rights violations in the years after the genocide. For
example, the new national army, integrating many former RPF
soldiers, massacred more than four thousand two hundred refugees in
the Kibeho refugee camp in south Rwanda in April 1995.'"
According to renowned historian G6rard Prunier, "the Kibeho
from Human Rights Watch and International Federation of Human Rights to United
Nations Security Council members (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org
/en/news/2006/06/01/ictr-should-address-serious-violations-internationalhumanitarian
-law-committed-rpa.
142. Erik M0se, supra note 46, at 934; Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at the
International Conference, supra note 40, at 42-43; Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at the
International Conference Assessing Legacy of the ICTR, session 5, Geneva, at 22
(July 11, 2009), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlNews/events/july
2009/SESSION5.pdf; see also Rachid Khan, Remarks at the International Conference
Assessing Legacy of the ICTR, session 3, Geneva, at 63 (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlNews/events/july2009/SESSION 3.pdf.
143. If the ICTR had prosecuted just one RPF soldier, it might have partly
dispelled the criticism of victor's justice, even though it could still have been criticized
for unfairness or bias.
144. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY
MATTERS 75 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/84264.
145. DES FORGES, supra note 6, at 91-92.
146. GtRARD PRUNIER, AFRICA'S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE 40-42 (2009).
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tragedy stood as a kind of dress rehearsal for much bigger things"
with the Rwandan invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo the
following year, massacres of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and of civilians inside Rwanda in the years that
followed. 14 7 Arguably, impunity for RPF crimes in Rwanda in 1994
emboldened the Rwandan government to commit crimes against
humanity and war crimes in northern Rwanda in the late 1990s and in
the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1996 onwards. 148
The paradigm of victor's justice may also affect deterrence,
although it may be too early to conclude whether international
tribunals contribute to specific or general deterrence. We are
nonetheless seeing that international criminal tribunals have led to an
increased awareness of what constitutes criminal behavior. For
example, in the Central African Republic, a rebel leader told Human
Rights Watch researchers that he "did not want to end up before the
ICC."l 49 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the International
Center for Transitional Justice found that the arrest of Congolese
warlord Thomas Lubanga "had an enormous educational impact,
making clear what was not previously understood: that recruiting,
enlisting, and using children to fight is a war crime."'o
A final consideration is whether victor's justice undermines
national reconciliation efforts within Rwanda. After all, the U.N.
Security Council wanted the ICTR to "contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.". To date, there is little evidence that international tribunals
promote reconciliation. It may, however, be too soon to judge the ad
hoc tribunals since they have been in existence less than twenty years,
and national reconciliation after terrible atrocities can take
147. Id.
148. See Jason Stearns & Federico Borello, Bad Karma: Accountability for
Rwandan Crimes in the Congo, in RECONSTRUCTING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING &
HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Lars Waldorf & Scott Straus, eds.,
forthcoming).
149. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 144, at 126.
150. LAURA DAVIS & PRISCILLA HAYNER, DIFFICULT PEACE, LIMITED JUSTICE:
TEN YEARS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE DRC 31 (2009), available at http://www.ictj.org/
static/Africa/DRC/ICTJDavisHaynerDRCDifficultPeace-pa2009.pdf.
151. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 31; see also Timothy Longman, Phuong Pham &
Harvey M. Weinstein, Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward
Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITy 214, 217 (Eric Stover &
Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., 2004).
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generations. One can nonetheless conclude that the ICTR's failure to
prosecute RPF crimes has not promoted reconciliation in Rwanda, as
impunity for these crimes remains a divisive issue.12
B. Creating a Historical Record
Another benefit of prosecuting all sides to a conflict is to
contribute to an accurate historical record that acknowledges the
suffering of all victims and protects against later revisionism or denial
of the atrocities. Trials themselves only tell part of the picture and
should not be expected to create history, but they are nonetheless
important in helping to establish a historical record.'53 The
requirement that judgments be based on proven facts in accordance
with evidentiary rules confers legitimacy on otherwise contested
facts.154 In addition, trials may reveal evidence that might not
otherwise have seen the light of day."'
It is important to set the record straight on the events of 1994
in Rwanda, as the genocide continues to polarize people both within
and without Rwanda.156 Despite a judicial finding by the ICTR that
the genocide took place and numerous nongovernmental
organizations' reports documenting the atrocities, rhetoric denying
the Rwandan genocide persists.' The ICTR's failure to prosecute
152. Rwandans are often reluctant to discuss RPF war crimes; they may do so
privately but certainly not publicly in light of the risk of being accused of
"divisionism" or "genocide ideology," both of which carry heavy criminal penalties.
However, in the course of Human Rights Watch's research on the legacy of the local
community-based gacaca courts, numerous individuals who were interviewed
expressed frustration at the failure to address all crimes committed in 1994 and stated
that the issue continues to divide communities.
153. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S FIRST YEARS 39 (2008), available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/10/courting-history-0 (internal citation omitted). Inter
national criminal tribunals may not be as comprehensive as an effective truth
commission in this regard, but may have greater legitimacy in the longer term.
154. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 144, at 6.
155. For example, the ICTY trials brought forward state secrets from Belgrade
during the trial of former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Similarly, the
exhumations of bodies in connection with the Srebrenica massacre exposed the lies of
the Bosnian Serb government which had downplayed the nature and extent of the
carnage. Id. at 117-18, 120-21.
156. NIGEL ELTRINGHAM, ACCOUNTING FOR HORROR: POST-GENOCIDE DEBATES
IN RWANDA 147-79 (2004).
157. Compare Canadian Conference on Rwandan Genocide Leads to Passionate
Exchanges, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.hirondellenews.
com/content/view5831/182/, with Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T,
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RPF crimes, along with the Rwandan government's refusal to
acknowledge those crimes, helps give credence to those who dismiss
the Tribunal and its genocide rulings as a political weapon of the RPF
to dominate the Hutu."' Prosecuting RPF crimes at the ICTR would
have exposed the government's misrepresentations and would have
recognized that both Tutsi and Hutu suffered in 1994. Such
prosecutions would not have denied the genocide or equated the
RPF's war crimes with genocide. They would only have given a more
accurate account of each side's role in the events of 1994.
C. Encouraging Domestic Judicial Reforms
One important contribution of international criminal tribunals,
such as the ICTR, has been the strengthening of domestic judicial
mechanisms through capacity building and pressure on states to prove
their willingness and ability to conduct their own trials
("complementarity" under the ICC regime). Arguably, international
tribunals have brought about quicker and more significant changes to
domestic legal systems than more traditional rule of law programs
funded by international actors. Such progress has been particularly
significant in the case of Rwanda, as evidenced by changes in four
main areas.
The first step came in 2004, when Rwanda constructed Mpanga
prison in the south of the country with financing from the Dutch
government."9 The seven million dollar prison is spread over eight
hectares and can hold seven thousand five hundred prisoners.6 In
2006, the government began making improvements to satisfy
international standards in the hope of receiving genocide suspects or
convicted persons from the ICTR and other states. Mpanga has a
special wing for these prisoners, with individual cells for up to thirty
Decision on Appeals Chamber Remand of Judicial Notice, 17 (Dec. 11, 2006)
(taking judicial notice of the following fact: "Between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994,
there was a genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group.").
158. See, e.g., Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, Speech (July 21, 2003) available at
http://www.inshuti.org/nizeyim4.htm; Press Release: Rally for the Return of Refugees
and Democracy in Rwanda, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Must
Rise Above the Politics, (July 23, 2001), available at http://www.inshuti.org/rdr35a;
Letter from Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza to United Nations and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Officials 3 (July 1, 2002), available at http://membres
.multimania.fr/barayagwizalfilesactualitetpiringerenceTPIR.pdf.
159. Mpanga: A Stronghold for the UN in Rwanda, INT'L JUSTICE TRIBUNE (May
4,2008), www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/mpanga-stronghold-un-rwanda.
160. Id.
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persons. As a result of these improvements, Rwanda has concluded
prisoner exchange agreements with Sierra Leone and the U.K. To
date, several convicted persons from Sierra Leone have been
transferred.16 1
In July 2007, Rwanda abolished the death penalty, commuting
the sentences of one thousand three hundred sixty-five persons to life
imprisonment. 62 This significant legislative change was the first step
in securing the transfer of genocide cases from the ICTR to Rwanda
for domestic prosecution.'6 ' However, the same law prescribes life
imprisonment in solitary confinement for certain crimes that
previously held the death penalty.6 ' In denying the transfer motions,
ICTR judges expressed concern that convicted persons might be
subject to this penalty, which would violate international norms
against cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment. Initially, the
Rwandan government attempted to argue that the law meant that
convicted persons would be kept in individual cells apart from the
general prison population but would be treated humanely.
Ultimately, the Rwandan government decided to amend the law. In
December 2008, the Rwandan Parliament adopted a new law stating
that the penalty of life in solitary confinement does not apply to
suspects transferred from the ICTR or extradited from other
countries - thereby satisfying the Tribunal's legal requirements."' In
161. James Karuhanga, ICTR Under Spotlight as Sierra Leone Convicts Arrive,
THE NEW TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?
issue=14067&article=21952. The improved prison conditions only apply to prisoners
transferred from the ICTR or foreign countries; conditions for other prisoners
remain problematic and do not meet international standards. See U.S. STATE DEP'T,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2009: RWANDA 3 (Mar. 11, 2009); CARINA
TERTSAKIAN, LE CHATEAU: THE LIVES OF PRISONERS IN RWANDA (2008).
162. Organic Law 31/2007 (July 25, 2007) Relating to the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, Official Journal, No. 46 Special Edition; see also Florence Mutesi, Death
Row: Over 1300 Survive Gallows, THE NEW TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/ index.php?issue=1269&article=473.
163. Rule 11 bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that a state
may receive a case for domestic prosecution where "the death penalty will not be
imposed or carried out."
164. Organic Law No. 31/2007, supra note 162, at arts. 4 and 5.
165. Organic Law No. 66/2008 (Nov. 21, 2008) Modifying and Completing Organic
Law No. 31/2007 (July 25, 2007) Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty,
Official Journal, No. 23, art. 1. The lifetime solitary confinement penalty remained
on the books for other domestic cases, however, continuing to raise concerns by
human rights groups who assert that prolonged solitary confinement constitutes
inhuman treatment and violates the Convention against Torture, the International
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December 2008, the Rwandan government went one step further and
acceded to the U.N. Convention Against Torture.166
Rwanda has also made strides in enhancing judicial
independence, although this is less true with sensitive and high-profile
cases.'6 ' Technical improvements in the judiciary have included the
hiring of more qualified judges, the creation of an office of the
ombudsman to oversee claims of corruption and annual reporting of
judges' income, and the power of habeas corpus. Controversy
remains around whether judges enjoy sufficient autonomy to resist
pressure from the government and influential community members,
168
or to withstand periodic review in order to retain their positions.
Some are also susceptible to corruption. As discussed above, in one
of the five cases in which ICTR judges were asked to transfer
genocide suspects to Rwanda, concerns were expressed over judicial
impartiality.'6 ' Although Rwanda has ratified international treaties
guaranteeing the right to be tried before an impartial tribunal and
included this right in its transfer law, the court expressed concerns
that a single judge might not be able to resist pressure.o Although
this finding was overturned on appeal, the U.K. High Court found
judicial independence lacking and concluded that, if defendants were
extradited, there would be a "real risk that they [the defendants]
would suffer a flagrant denial of justice." 7 ' As a result of these
decisions, Rwanda again amended its law and, in May 2009, adopted
legislation allowing the President of the High Court to appoint three
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights. See Letter from Avocats Sans Frontibres, Human Rights Watch,
and Penal Reform Int'l to the Rwandan Judicial Authorities (May 19, 2008)
166. Press Release, Avocats Sans Frontibres, The ratification of the Convention
Against Torture: A step forward in the adoption of international norms of justice and
human rights (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.eurac-network.org/web/
uploads/documents/20090629j11634.pdf.
167. U.S. STATE DEP'T, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: RWANDA 7 (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at
44-69.
168. In 2008, most judges saw their tenure reduced from life to four or five years,
which some human rights groups and donors saw as a move limiting their
independence.
169. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 96-36-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 28,
2008).
170. Id. 40.
171. Brown v. Government of Rwanda, [2009] EWHC 770, [1211 (Eng.).
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or more judges to preside over cases transferred from the ICTR or
abroad based on the "complexity and importance of the case."17 2
Finally, Rwanda has responded to concerns by the ICTR and
foreign jurisdictions that it does not sufficiently protect witnesses.
The main concern, as described in one trial at the ICTR, is that
"regardless of whether their fears are well founded, witnesses in
Rwanda may be unwilling to testify for the defense as a result of the
fear that they may face threats, harassment, arrest or accusations of
harbouring 'genocidal ideology."" 3 Incidents of harassment,
violence, and misuse of the genocide ideology law similarly convinced
courts in France, Germany, and the U.K. to deny transfers.'74 in
effect, the witness protection issue has been the most significant
obstacle to securing transfer of cases because it undermines Rwanda's
ability to ensure a fair trial for an accused person. The Rwandan
government responded with legislative amendments in May 2009.
Such amendments provide that a witness cannot be charged with
genocide ideology for his/her in-court testimony and that a witness
residing outside Rwanda may give testimony through deposition or
video link."'
These developments in the Rwandan justice sector have been
positive, even if they have not yet been sufficient to secure the
transfer of genocide suspects from the ICTR or national jurisdictions.
However, to date, they have not been accompanied by a parallel
boost in Rwandans' confidence in their own judicial system. Despite
the improvements, a number of Rwandans, particularly those who
work in the judicial system, have told Human Rights Watch that they
continue to believe the justice system is incapable of rendering fair
and impartial justice."' Rwandans view the domestic courts as
politicized and open to corruption, with decisions under the influence
172. Organic Law No. 3/2009 (May 26, 2009) Modifying and Complementing the
Organic Law No. 11/2007 (Mar. 16, 2007) Concerning the Transfer of Cases from the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Other States, $ 1.
173. Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 00-55B-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, 67
(June 19, 2008).
174. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 96-36-R11bis, Decision on the
Case of Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, $$ 59-
66 (May 28,2008).
175. Organic Law No. 3/2009 (May 26, 2009) Modifying and Complementing the
Organic Law No. 11/2007 (March 16, 2007) Concerning the Transfer of Cases from
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Other States, 2.
176. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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of government figures."' The Kabgayi case may have only reinforced
Rwandans' disillusionment with domestic courts.
D. Weakening the Justification for International Criminal Tribunals
Much has been said about the impact of the ICTR's prosecution
strategy on Rwanda, but there are also far-reaching implications for
the future of international justice. Beyond undermining the
credibility and legacy of the ICTR, the ICTR's failure to prosecute
RPF crimes sets a dangerous precedent and weakens the argument
for international tribunals. The raison d'Otre of international tribunals
is, of course, the need to deliver justice for serious violations of
international humanitarian law where national courts cannot deliver
effective justice. The legitimacy of international tribunals also rests
largely on the notion that they are more impartial than national
courts and are governed by international legal norms rather than
domestic criminal law or political sway. They are expected to adhere
to procedural fairness and equality before the law in a way that is not
always possible in national jurisdictions. If, however, the tribunals do
not meet that standard or fulfill their mandate, the future of
international justice may be less optimistic than we once thought.
The ICTR stands as a cautionary tale about what happens when
international tribunals do not gain state cooperation. At first, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) seemingly tried to duck the issue
by not indicting state actors. This quickly gave rise to perceptions of
one-sided justice. Such perceptions were exacerbated by the ICC
prosecutor's joint press conference with the Ugandan President when
he announced investigations in northern Uganda against the rebel
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) but not against Ugandan soldiers."'
In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Prosecutor has
indicted leaders of different rebel groups that were sometimes on
opposing sides in the conflict, though not any of the state actors. By
contrast to the three state referrals (Uganda, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and the Central African Republic), the ICC Prosecutor has
indicted state actors - including the President - in his case against
Sudan, which was referred by the U.N. Security Council.
Unfortunately, state cooperation is lacking and international pressure
has not yet been sufficient to secure Sudanese President Bashir's
177. Id.
178. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 41.
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The ICTR's failure to reassert jurisdiction over the RPF case
after a sham trial sets a poor example for the ICC when applying its
own complementarity principle.'8 Under complementarity, a case is
admissible before the ICC where a state is unwilling or unable to
carry out the investigations or prosecutions. The ICC must look
beyond whether the domestic proceedings adhere to fair trial
standards and assess whether the trial proceedings were "genuine."'
The RPF trial is an example of where this did not happen. The ICTR
Prosecutor focused only on the technical procedural fairness of the
proceedings and failed to consider whether the prosecution was
genuine. In particular, he needed to look beyond the court record
and compare the prosecution theory of the case with evidence outside
the proceedings to reach a conclusion about the trial's lack of
genuineness. His own investigation and those of others, including the
U.N. and nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International, demonstrate the widespread nature of
RPF massacres in 1994 and challenge the Rwandan military
prosecutor's theory of the case.
Our concern is that the ICC may do no better and will tend
toward giving too much deference to national proceedings. Like the
ICTR, it may not want to jeopardize relations with state parties on
whose cooperation it depends. Prosecutors and judges will be wary of
substituting their own theory of the case and evidentiary findings for
those of domestic actors. The Court may also choose not to divert
179. International pressure has nonetheless been successful in limiting President
Bashir's travel. For example, he did not attend South African President Jacob
Zuma's inauguration in May 2009 for fear of being arrested in South Africa. See
Katy Gabel, Facing Arrest, Bashir Stays Away from South Africa, BUSINESS DAY
(May 7, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200905070644.html. A trip to attend an
international conference in Uganda was similarly cancelled in July 2009. See Justin
Dralaze, Uganda to Mull Arrest if Sudan's Bashir Comes, REUTERS, July 13, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD147555.
180. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 17, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9.
181. An expert panel on complementarity, convened by the ICC prosecutor in
2003, noted that the prosecutor bears the burden of proof for showing that domestic
proceedings are not genuine and that there should be "a policy of giving the benefit
of the doubt to States exercising jurisdiction and assuming that they are acting in
good faith." INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 14 (2003), available at
http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/OTP/Informal%20Expert%20paper%2The%
20principle%20of%20complementarity%20in%20practice.pdf.
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resources from its own investigations and prosecutions to make in-
depth inquiries of a state's willingness to conduct a fair and
meaningful trial. The result would be, as in the case of the ICTR, an
inability or unwillingness to recognize sham proceedings designed to
shield perpetrators from justice.
VII. Conclusion
Seeking justice for the victims of RPF crimes neither denies the
genocide nor equates these crimes with genocide. It simply asserts
that all victims, regardless of the horror of the crimes or the power of
the alleged perpetrators, have the right to see justice done. This is the
principle by which the ICTR Office of the Prosecutor should have
been guided in its work. The ICTR understandably prioritized
genocide cases at the outset, in part because of their gravity and in
part because it needed cooperation from Rwandan authorities. Yet,
its work would never be complete without the investigation and
prosecution of crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
Once Rwanda made clear that it would not cooperate with these
prosecutions - going so far as to derail genocide cases at the Tribunal
by stopping the flow of witnesses - the ICTR Prosecutor should have
protested more forcefully and expressly stated that fulfilling the
Tribunal's mandate required outside pressure to force Rwandan
cooperation. Former Prosecutor Del Ponte tried to do this in 2002
but was unsuccessful in mobilizing the necessary international
resolve. Prosecutor Jallow never tried, preferring instead to keep
everyone guessing as to his intentions until the last possible moment.
In the end, he succumbed to Rwandan pressure and decided to
transfer the clergy massacre to Rwanda for domestic prosecution in
2008. He chose to acquiesce in a pretense of justice rather than
recognize an absence of justice. That choice not only tarnishes the
Tribunal's real accomplishments and undermines its legacy, it also
sets a terrible precedent for the future of international justice.
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